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ABSTRACT
Tittle of Dissertation: Vessel Traffic Service as a Maritime Security Tool: Vessel
Traffic Management Information Systems (VTMIS) in Ghana
Degree: MSc
The dissertation is an assessment of the role of the VTMIS in enhancing efforts to bring
down maritime security in the threats in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa focusing on
Ghana.
According to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Vessel Traffic Service
(VTS) is implemented by a Competent Authority to improve the safety and efficiency of
vessel traffic and to protect the environment. Technological development today has led
to significant improvements in vessel traffic service. Vessel Traffic Management
Information Service is the integration of Management information systems to improve
the quality of vessel traffic services. Vessel traffic services essentially are used for
information services, navigational assistance services, traffic organisation services, and
similar allied services. Increasingly, threats to maritime safety and security in the Gulf of
Guinea area are becoming major issues in the world. This study investigated the role of
the VTMIS in Ghana in enhancing and combating maritime security threat such as
piracy, smuggling and trafficking, in the Gulf of Guinea area. The study collected
primary qualitative data from respondents from agencies in Ghana that uses information
from the VTMIS for the assessment. It also relied on secondary data from the IMO and
Ghana Maritime Authority on incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The study
revealed that VTMIS in Ghana contributes significantly to security of offshore
installations in Ghana. It also reveal that Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in
monitoring and reporting maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea area.
KEYWORDS: Assessment, Vessel Traffic Service, Maritime Safety and Security, Gulf
of Guinea, Offshore installations
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the study
Maritime security is an integral to the success of the worldwide maritime transportation
chain. Major threats to maritime security include terrorism, unlawful acts such as piracy
and arm robbery at sea, smuggling of migrants and drugs, threats to resource security,
and environmental threats such as pollution incidents and illegal dumping (Ameri and
Shewchuk, 2007). Maritime Security is therefore the combination of preventive and
responsive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats and intentional
unlawful acts (Feldt, Roell, and Thiel, 2013). According to researchers such as Ameri
and Shewchuk (2007), maritime security and safety are complimentary concepts with
common objectives. Feldt et at. (2013, p1) stated that “maritime safety is the
combination of preventive and responsive measures intended to protect the maritime
domain against, and limit the effect of, accidental or natural danger, harm, and damage
to the environment, risks or loss.”
Both security and safety have been major areas of concern to the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) and the international community. The International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 has provided standard guidelines for
enhancing maritime security. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US) a
comprehensive set of measures contained in the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) were developed to enhance the security of ships and port
facilities (International Maritime Organization, 2015). The adoption of Resolution
A.578 (14) ‘guidelines for vessel traffic services’ by the IMO was also focused on
preventing maritime disasters and protecting the marine environment (International
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Association of Marine Aids, 2012). The original guidelines for vessel traffic services
were revised and adopted in 1997 as Resolution A.857 (20). IMO defined Vessel traffic
service (VTS) in this new resolution as “a service implemented by a Competent
Authority, designed to improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect
the environment” (International Maritime Organization, 1997, p.3).
The purpose of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to provide active monitoring and
navigational advice for vessels in busy waterways (United States Coast Guard, 2015).
According to the European Commission (2008) VTS systems are intended to ensure
maritime safety in particular areas of dense shipping. The IMO identifies three
categories of services provided by VTS systems including information services, traffic
organization services, and navigational assistance services (International Maritime
Organization, 1997). VTS systems consist of land based control centers that receive
information from sensors such as radar, Automatic Identification System (AIS) and
closed circuit television (CCTV) (European Commission, 2008). Some VTS systems
also integrate Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) data centers to enable
them identify and track ships globally. VTS installations therefore provide valuable
surveillance information on offshore infrastructures such as oilrigs, seabed cables, and
pipelines. According to the European Commission’s report, VTS systems include
mechanisms for tracking, receiving and reporting distress messages from vessels and
therefore help in fighting maritime crime.
1.2 Problem Statement
According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs report released in 2013, piracy,
armed robbery at sea, and illegal fishing are on the ascendency in the Gulf of Guinea
(GoG) area. There have been collaborative actions by coastal countries in West Africa
to reverse the situation in order to ensure the security of maritime activities in the GoG
Region. However, although VTS is recognized as a valuable security information tool,
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its establishment in many countries is very slow. One major factor accounting for this is
due to the fact that there has not been much empirical assessment of its role in
enhancing maritime security. Using the Vessel Traffic Management and Information
System (VTMIS) in Ghana as basis, the main objective of this study is to discuss the
role of VTS in enhancing maritime security in the GoG Region. This thesis will identify
both weaknesses and strengths of VTS in enhancing maritime security. Anyiam (2014,
p12) recommended “GoG states must invest in modern technology in their efforts to
combat maritime crime.” He argued that VTS systems equipped with AIS and LRIT
“could be useful for purposes of maritime security surveillance.” The potency of this
recommendation will be tested in this thesis.
1.3 Research Objective
To assess the role of VTS in enhancing maritime security in the GoG area and work
specifically to:
1. To investigate how VTS can contribute to the increase of security level of
offshore installations ( pipe lines, oil rigs, cables etc)
2. To access how VTS capabilities are integrated in the effort to fight against crime
in the GoG.
3. To identity short falls in it use and propose ways to overcome.
1.4 Research Questions
1. How can VTS be used to provide security monitoring of offshore installations?
2. How can VTS be integrated in the effort against crime in the GoG?
3. What are the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool and how can they be
removed?
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1.5 Significance of Study
West Africa is identified as part of the prone areas of maritime piracy in the
contemporary era. Most of the reported incidents in the GoG are violent actions for the
purpose of stealing. Although most unlawful acts against vessels in the GoG are
erroneously reported, there is general consensus that the rate of such unlawful acts is on
the increase in recent years (Anyiam, 2014). Anyiam’s report stated that between 1995
and 2014, about 843 incidents of acts considered unlawful against vessels were
reported.

This study is significant because it will help understand how VTS can

contribute in the reduction of unlawful acts against vessels in the GoG. It will also
source of information to researchers and pave the way for future research in the area of
VTS in the GoG region.
1.6 Scope, Limitation and delimitation
The scope of study is limited to the use of VTS in maritime security areas such as
unlawful acts against vessels and protection of offshore infrastructure. The IMO
resolution (A857 (20)) that provides the guidelines for vessel traffic services identifies
three categories of services provided by VTS systems. These include information
services, traffic organization services, and navigational assistance services. Primarily,
the VTMIS in Ghana is being used as an information service tool and aid to maritime
Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. This therefore defined the focus of the study to
assess how VTMIS is used in the fight against maritime crime. If other countries like
Nigeria, Liberia, and Ivory Coast had VTMIS systems the scope of the study could have
been broader. However, Ghana is the only country with a VTS system in the GoG
region presently. The study would therefore relay on information solely from Ghana’s
VTS operations for the analysis.
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1.7 Structure of Thesis
The study is divided into five chapters. In chapter one the background and research
problem is presented. In this chapter, the relationship between VTS and maritime
security and safety is also discussed as well as the research problem and objectives. The
justifications for the research and limitations have also been discussed. In Chapter Two,
the research methods were discussed. Included in this chapter is a discussion on the
sources of data, qualitative research method, targeted group, sampling technique, and
ethical issues. The reasons for choice of qualitative method and choice of sampling
techniques will be explained. Chapter Three reviewed related literature on VTS and
maritime security and safety. The review focused on the use of VTS in protecting
offshore installations and in fighting crime. In addition, literature on the shortfalls of
VTS in achieving maritime security was reviewed. This helped identify the gaps in
literature on maritime security and safety and VTMIS to be addressed. The fourth
Chapter discussed qualitative data collected. The discussions are themed under the sub
objectives of the study. Chapter Five will present a summary of the results in Chapter
Four. It will also state the findings of the study and recommendations for policy makers
and future studies.

5

CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH METHODS
2.1 Sources of Data
Data will be collected from both primary and secondary sources for the study. Primary
data is first hand information for a particular investigation. According to Currie (2015,
p.89) “primary data are data that were previously unknown and which have been
obtained directly by the researcher for a particular research project.” According to
ACAPS (2012, p.3); “primary data is most generally understood as data gathered from
the information source and which has not undergone analysis before being included in
the needs assessment. Primary data is collected directly from the affected population by
the assessment team through field work.” On the other hand, secondary data refers to
data collected by other researchers that already exist in the literature (University of
Surrey, 2014). According to ACAPS, “secondary data is information which has
typically been collected by researchers not involved in the current assessment and has
undergone at least one layer of analysis prior to inclusion in the needs assessment.
Secondary data can comprise published research, internet materials, media reports, and
data which has been cleaned, analysed and collected for a purpose other than the need
assessment, such as academic research or an agency or sector specific monitoring
reports.” This was used in the review of literature for finding gaps that needed answers.
It provided useful information and serve as a source of historical data on VTS and
maritime security in the GoG.
Particularly, the following secondary data was used in the investigation: reports on
VTMIS by GMA, The IALA publications, Hart (2014), Professors Dalaklis, Siousiouras
and Nikitakos (2009), and the International Maritime Organization, (2015). GISIS:
Piracy and armed robbery. Materials on procedures, equipment, and other
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documentation on VTS from IALA will. The information from Professors Dalaklis,
Siousiouras and Nikitakos (2009) on the advantages of VTMIS in Greece was compared
with the VTMIS in Ghana to identify similarities and differences. The data from the
International Maritime Organization (2015) online database on the regional statistics on
unlawful acts such as piracy and armed robbery and other related crimes served as
guided information in the discussion of results. The IMO’s data together with Hart
(2014) reviews on trends in maritime crime in the GoG was used in understanding the
nature of maritime security threats in the region.
2.2 Research Method
In every investigation, the choice of a particular method (or methods) is a very
important decision because it affects the results of the entire research. The kind of data
that we need determines how we should go about collecting it and what methods we
should adopt (Currie, 2015). ACAPS (2012) stated that “qualitative research explores
information from the perspective of both groups and individuals and generates case
studies and summaries rather than lists of numeric data.” Upon careful evaluation of the
nature of the topic the qualitative research method was therefore employed in gathering
first primary data. Parkinson and Drislane (2011) defined qualitative research as the
type that uses methods such as participant observation or case studies which result in a
narrative or descriptive account of a setting or practice. Such data are often textual
observations that portray attitudes, perceptions or intentions. Qualitative research has
also been defined as research that uses data that do not indicate ordinal values (Guest,
Namey, and Mitchell, 2013). Whereas quantitative research focuses on how many and
how much, qualitative data answer questions of how and why events of phenomena
exist.
According to the University of Surrey, 2014 the benefits of the qualitative approach is
that the information is richer and has a deeper insight into the phenomenon under study.
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Research in maritime security requires detailed data. However, in many cases this
information is often classified coupled with the fact that VTS systems are equipped with
high tech devices that gather data for analysis and use. As stated by Guest, Namey, and
Mitchell (2013), the advantage of qualitative research is the ability to probe into
responses and observations as needed and obtain more detailed descriptions and
explanations of experiences. Patton and Cochran (2002) added that when it comes to
face validity, the qualitative data acquisition process provides an additional advantage.
Another advantage of the qualitative approach is that it explores relationships and
perceptions held by affected persons and communities. Consequently, smaller sample
sizes chosen purposefully is advantageous because “some informants are more likely to
provide greater insight and understanding of a disaster’s impact to the assessment team,
due to a variety of factors including their social, economic, educational, and cultural
position in the community” (ACAPS, 2012, p.8). At this early stage of the VTMIS
phase in Ghana a research method that allows careful consideration of participants
would yield better results than when someone is selected at random to answer a
qualitative question. This research method was able to collect rich and detailed
information in a limited time and resources.
2.3 Research Participants
According to ACAPS (2012, p.11) key informant interviews provide vital information
on individual perspectives and experiences through direct discussion. The reports
defined a key informant, as a person with prior knowledge of the issues in a community
who can provide information on behalf of the community on the impact of such issues
and on the priority community needs. It added questions meant for key informant seek
to explore the impact of the issue on the community as a whole. The data collected can
be combined and analysed to develop an understanding of how for example “an issue
has affected different (sub) groups of a population, why it has so affected them, and
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what their ensuing priority needs and concerns are and are likely to be over time.” This
research was done primarily with key informants from varies state agencies that uses
the VTMIS in Ghana.
The Ghana Maritime Authority is the state agency responsible for maritime
administration; this agency established and operates the VTMIS in Ghana. Nonetheless
other stakeholders in the maritime industry in the country are given monitoring stations
to aid them in their operations. In order to collect information from different
perspectives and experiences, two participants where interviewed from the GMA and
the other state agencies including the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, Narcotics
Control Board, Fisheries Department, Immigration Service, and, Ghana Navy, as well
as the Customs and Preventive Service. The participants were selected to answer
questions sent via email, Google docs forms, and or interviewed on phone.

2.4 Interview Procedure
Interviews are the central technique in qualitative inquires because it allows complexity
of process to be captured with just a handful of individuals (Moayoux, 2011; Patton and
Cochran, 2002). This study used in-depth interview technique in acquiring data from
the participants. Open-ended interview offers the interviewer the ability to ask question
in different ways and from different angles. These help the participants to understand
the issues of the study and offer rich data for the researcher. ACAPS (2012, p.3)
“primary data is most often collected through face to face interviews or discussions with
members of the affected community, but can also be gathered through phone interviews,
radio communication, email exchange, and direct observation.”
On the forms that were sent via email or Google docs to participants, excerpts from the
consent form that introduced the research to the participants preceded the interview
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questions. During the introduction, participants were also told that all the information
collected for the study would be treated with confidentiality. Participants were first
asked to state the name of their organisation. In the Google Form this was set as a
“required” response. This action was necessary to differentiate the government agencies
that they belong. This will also guide in the interpretation of their responses, because
the different agencies used the information from the VTMIS to meet their own
operations.
Apart from the introduction, the main investigation was structured into fourteen
questions. The interviews questions were carefully designed to cover the objectives of
the study. The study intended to investigate how VTS can contribute to the increase
security level of offshore installations; to access how VTS capabilities are integrated in
the effort to reduce maritime crime in the GoG; and identity short falls of the system.
The questions that were used for the interviews are discussed in detail bellow.

What is your background?
The first question was required to understand the participant’s background, work
experience, current job specification and expertise. Their shared experience brought
about an understanding and appreciation of their response to questions.
Could you take me through the general set-up of the VTS system in Ghana? (in terms
of infrastructure).
The second interview question was meant to understand whether, the participants who
were drawn from agencies in Ghana had adequate knowledge about how the VTMIS
was set-up. Although this question was meant to test their understanding of the physical
set-up in terms of infrastructure and network, it is understood that these are very
technical issues and only staff from GMA could answer it in a satisfactory manner. So
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for other participants outside of GMA, mere understanding of the departments that were
linkup as well as the source of the information was considered as enough.
What are the usefulness of the VTMIS to Ghana and the West African sub-region?
Question three, was formulated to test general theoretical knowledge of the possible
uses of VTMIS in Ghana and West African region. Respondents general knowledge
helped understand how they are using the system now and how they could use it in the
future. This contributed information to answering the second sub-objective.
Are there other government agencies that benefit from the VTMIS? (If so list them
and the nature of information they receive from VTMIS)
This was linked up to the knowledge of general usefulness of VTMIS. The system
integrated government agencies in the maritime sector to share vessel traffic
information for purposes of safety, planning and prevention of crime in the maritime
domain. The question will help understand the various agencies linked up in the VTMIS
and the kind of information deemed useful to that agencies.
Are there targeted areas during VTMIS operations? i.e.: (Restricted zones, or areas
where pipeline are laid)
This question was targeted at the GMA respondents to know whether during operations
they monitor certain restricted zone in Ghana’s waters. Focus areas including areas
demarcated as areas to be avoided, pipelines, other state protected areas, zones where
fishing is not allowed etc. This question helped to investigate the first sub-objective of
the study.
What are the communication mediums used in the VTMIS to contact and
communicate with vessels and between VTS centres?
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Question six intended to list the various options available in the system for establishing
communication via voice (audio) and text to vessel. It also included medium on which
internal communication between VTS centres and monitoring stations are done. This
brought understanding as to what assistance the VTMIS could offer to vessels such as in
time of distress. The options available and how effective they are partly determines how
reliable the VTMIS is.
How far in terms of nautical miles is the coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS?
The coverage area of the system is also important. This question helped to identify the
different devices that fed data into the VTMIS and how far in nautical miles the coast of
Ghana was covered. This would help to understand whether the system could identify
unlawful acts in the areas away from the coastline and the territorial waters.
How can VTS be used to provide security monitoring of offshore installations?
This question intended to find out how VTS is used in practical terms to monitor state
and private infrastructure along the coast of Ghana. The answers brought about
information on how it is used currently, and how it can be improved in the future to
enhance maritime security.
What is the role of VTMIS in ensuring maritime security?
The question was meant to test the roles Ghana’s VTMIS is playing in preventing and
combating maritime security threats along the GoG specifically within the nations’
maritime domain. Respondent’s views on maritime security were different, so the
definition adopted in the literature was applied to issues listed. Maritime security
includes a wide variety of issues. The study adopted (Bueger, 2014) semiotics concept
of defining maritime security. This looks at how maritime security relates to other
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concepts such as maritime safety, blue economy, and human resilience. This question
directly answered sub-objective two.
How can VTS be integrated in the fight against crime in the GoG?
Sub-objective two, intended “to access how VTS capabilities are integrated in the effort
to fight against crime in the GoG.” This question solicited respondents’ views on the
role the system is playing in fighting unlawful acts or maritime crime.
What are the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool and how can they be
removed? What are the limitations in the use of VTS as a monitoring tool?
Questions eleven and twelve, were intended to identify the short falls in the use of
VTMIS in Ghana since the facilities installation. They questions directly correlate to the
third specific objective.
What are the training requirements for VTS staff? (Qualifications)
This was designed to understand whether the training requirements for VTMIS
personnel were in accordance with IMO regulations and IALA requirements.
Are there regulations that VTMIS authorities are expected to comply? (If so list and
explain them)
Installation and operation of VTMIS must be done in accordance with IMO SOLAS
convention chapter V regulation 12. This question tested whether the management was
done in accordance with such regulations.
2.5 Data collection Process
Telephone calls were made to the participants to establish contact for interview and
days to be arranged. The respondent were humbly asked whether they would prefer to
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be interviewed on phone, receive email with the questions, or receive a link that would
lead them to Google Docs for the interview.

2.6 Limitation
The study adopted a definition of maritime security to help delineate the boundaries of
maritime crime. Bueger’s proposed semiotics concept suited the needs of the study
except that one of the concepts of projecting seapower at sea was not covered in this
study. Relating maritime security to seapower is deemed beyond the scope of the study.
Embracing a definition of maritime security based on seapower would invariably
include other agencies even as the Navy. Since much of the information is classified,
the study excluded all maritime security threats dealing with defense. Maritime security
was only related by semiotics to maritime safety, blue-economy, and human resilience.
This prevented the study from examining how VTMIS can assist in combating maritime
threats such as arms proliferation, terrorist acts, interstate dispute or corporation which
indeed qualified as maritime crime issues.
Bueger’s semiotics concepts eventually led to his design of the Maritime Security
Matrix (MSM). The MSM allows for the study of the types of relations established by
different actors between maritime security and other concepts and provides bases for
scrutinizing what actors include and exclude in their concept of maritime security.
However, a weakness is that interpretations of threats can differ remarkably. What
constitutes piracy for example is a matter of debate. Although IMO data on unlawful
acts in the GoG indicated that the over 80% of the acts considered as piracy in the GoG
should be treated as crimes with maritime jurisdictions, they are often reported as acts
of piracy. The lists of threats or maritime crimes identified were subject to these
differences.
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Limited data on other identified threat of maritime security such as smuggling,
pollution, unlawful and unregulated fishing, and human trafficking. Only data on piracy
and armed robbery was readily available on IMO websites and in (Hurt, 2014).

2.7 Ethical issues
Ethical and data protection issues are very critical for all researchers. The University of
Surrey (2014) stated that ethical principles seek to work towards protecting the
participants, communities and environments involved in the studies against any form of
harm, manipulation or malpractice. In essence, the three major principles of ethics that
every research should address include informed consent, confidentiality and avoiding
harm. This study will seek consent of every participant and allow him or her to
withdraw from the interviews at any point they wish to do so. All data acquired was
treated with confidentiality. Interviews were also done in professional manner to protect
participants from any harm.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Introduction
Maritime Transportation serves about 90 percent of global trade (Allianz Global
Corporate, 2014). Shipping therefore plays a vital role in the export and import of
goods in the world (International Chamber of Shipping, 2013). Technological
innovations and developments in the maritime industry have affected shipping and both
high sea and near the coastline fishing. There has been a transition from wind and
manual powered fishing vessels to mechanized steam vessels. According to Professors
Dalaklis and Siousioura, (2009, p.2), reliable electronic devices help in precise position
determination of vessel at sea. They added that automatic devices installed in ship’s
bridges play significant roles in reducing to possibility of maritime accidents due to
technical errors and that “such innovation can be considered as a major contributor to
the solution of the rising transport challenges.” Sewell, Jefferson, and Oakley (2006, p1)
noted that improvements in innovation have “enabled fishing vessels to tow larger,
heavier gear, resulting in higher catches.”
However, a number of negative consequences have come with the increased
international shipping and fishing. On maritime accident for example Professors
(Siousiouras and Dalaklis, 2009, p.2) stated that, “they started with the very first efforts
to conquer and tame the seas and the oceans and even today, in the so called “digital
era”, maritime disasters or mishaps appear rather frequent in the news.” A total of 228
lives were lost between 2011 and 2013 around European Union (EU) waters due to
maritime accidents (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2014). Maritime accidents
leads to serious injuries or loss of life, damage to ships, material damage, pollution, and
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damage to the environment. With regards to the increment in catches, Sewell et al.
(2006) noted that this comes at the risk of greater environmental damage.
According to (Prof. Siousiouras and Prof. Dalaklis, 2009) “providing guidance from
ashore to a vessel underway is quite often necessary in order to avoid unpleasant
mishaps at sea, such as a collision or grounding.” Implementing a VTS helps in
identifying and monitoring vessels. Additionally, it enhances provision of navigational
information and assistance to vessels and can assist in prevention of pollution as well as
coordination of pollution response (International Maritime Organization, 1997). The
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Chapter V, Regulation
12 sets legislative requirements for governments that intend to establish VTS to aid
navigation and enhance maritime safety. IMO Resolution A857 (20) adopted in 1997 on
the “Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)” also contains guidelines for operating
a VTS. This chapter reviews literature on the use of VTS by selected group of nations to
aid in safety of navigation and security in the maritime domain. The essential
components of a VTS system are discussed. Maritime security statistics in the Gulf of
Guinea (GoG) area is reviewed. The current chapter also reviews the roles VTS can
play in maritime security in the GoG area.
3.2 Development of Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
Maritime transportation has always been the backbone for world commerce. From the
days of early voyages in the Arabian sea to the Roman expansion of trade routes in the
Mediterranean Sea; from the Arabian age of discovery in the 7th century to the time the
compass was invented in China in the 11th century; from the European age of discovery
in the 15th century to modern maritime shipping in the 19th and 21st centuries, people
have wanted to explore what was beyond the sea (Rodrigue, Comtois, and Slack, 2006).
Not just the desire to transport goods, but also the need for safe and efficient voyages
have been major concerns in maritime transportation.
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To this end, “authorities throughout the world have provided aids to navigation in and
around their coastal waters” (International Association of Marine Aids, 2012, p16).
According to the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and
Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) VTS Manual 2012, the earliest aids to navigation were
mostly shore-side beacons and lights, followed by the introduction of buoys. With time,
these aids were improved upon and audible signals were added. In the 1940s, vessel
traffic increased in major ports of Europe. Coupled with bad weather conditions, port
operations were disrupted as serious traffic congestions resulted.
This meant that a new approach was needed to help decongest vessel traffic in ports as
well as enhance safety of navigation. IALA VTS Manual states that the best option at
the time was to use shore-based radar combined with communications components to
monitor maritime traffic. Thus in combination with VHF radio, a traffic surveillance
system was achieved and real time information exchange between the shore and ships
became possible. The first radar based Port Control station was established in Douglas,
Isle of Man in 1948, however the radar set installed in the Port of Liverpool later the
same year is regarded as the pioneer of the modem VTS system (Ustaoglu and Furusho,
2014). Shore based radar controls gradually spread out and became common in most
major European and North American ports and harbors in 1960s and in Asia in early
1970s (International Association of Marine Aids, 2012; Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014).
As shore based radars were being explored as aids to navigations, a series of maritime
disasters including the Exxon Valdez, Torrey Canyon, Meluta and Amoco Cadiz
stretching from 1960 to 1980s increased concerns for safety in shipping and protection
of maritime environment. IALA pointed out that various researchers put forward the
idea that the use of simple vessel traffic management would increase operational hours
resulting in better utilisation of a port’s capacity and has reduced the number of
maritime accidents. Therefore in the wake of these disasters, radar surveillance and
vessel traffic managements system were introduced in numerous ports.
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3.3 IMO Guidelines for Operating VTS
However, in these early days when it become clear that radar aided traffic management
was the way forward, port authorities, pilots, and shipmasters debated on the
navigational regulatory system that must be used. Because there was no agreement
among these stakeholders, then it was a fact that a form of international harmonization
was needed on this new radar surveillance and aid system. According to Bowditch
(2002, p387), the “consequences of collision or grounding for modern ship carrying
tremendous quantities of high-value, perhaps dangerous cargo are so severe that
authorities have instituted many types of regulations and control systems to minimize
the chances of loss.” He added that the regulations often concern navigation,
communications, equipment, procedures, personnel, and many other aspects of ship
management. Just like navigation, which was once independent throughout the world
and later regulated by the IMO, reregulating VTS was a sure way to ensure uniformity
in different regions and among different stakeholders.
The then Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) now the
IMO, examined and published Resolution A.158 “Port Advisory Services” adopted by
the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in its seventeenth session. The resolution had
two main recommendations. The resolution recommended to governments that they:
firstly, consider setting up VTS services in ports and their approaches that warrant it by
the importance and nature of traffic. (This was recommended particularly for oil
terminals and ports where noxious or hazardous cargoes are loaded and unloaded).
Secondly, the resolution also recommended governments to instruct masters, to help
improve safety, by early notification of appropriate authorities of expected times of
arrival (International Maritime Organisation, 1968). Following this, the IMO in 1985
adopted Resolution A.578 (14) Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Service.
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Bowditch (2002) explained that these guidelines contained in A.578 (14) recognized
that the level of safety and efficiency in the movement of maritime traffic within a VTS
service area is dependent upon close cooperation between VTS authority and
participating vessels. The guidelines also recognized that different operational
procedures would likely cause confusion to masters of vessels moving from one VTS
area to another. Broadly, Resolution A.578 (14) addressed operation procedures and
planning a VTS. Nonetheless, the guidelines failed to resolve a number of issues.
According to the International Association of Marine Aids (2012), the guidelines did
not address issues on liability or responsibility which needed consideration by the VTS
authorities. The report maintained that, guidelines also failed to create new rights to
enact legislation on the requirements for shipping. In addition, guidelines on
recruitment as well as requirements on qualifications and training of VTS personnel
were also left out. To address the issues left out, the IMO revised the original resolution
and adopted a new Resolution A.857 (20) “Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services” in
1997 which is still in force. According to Bowditch latest publication which includes
two important annexes, namely, Guidelines and Criteria for VTS and Guidelines on
Recruitment, Qualifications and Training of VTS Operators.
3.4 IMO Legislation on VTS
The major legislative instrument on VTS in the IMO is the Safety of Life At Sea
(SOLAS) Convention. Chapter V “Safety of Navigation” of the SOLAS convention
amended in 2000 contains regulation on the establishment of VTS by member parties.
Particularly, Regulation 11, “Ship Reporting Systems” and Regulation 12, “Vessel
Traffic Services” list requirements necessary for the operation of a VTS. Regulation 11
was devoted to guidelines for governments and shipmaster on adopting and
implementing ship reporting system, to ensure safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency
of navigation and protection of the marine environment. Regulation 12 extensively,
outlined requirements for contracting governments that intend to establish VTS
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systems. It is divided into five paragraphs as quoted following. The paragraphs in the
Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention, Chapter V, Regulation 12: Vessel Traffic
Services are:
1. Vessel traffic services (VTS) contribute to safety of life at sea, safety and
efficiency of navigation and protection of the marine environment, adjacent
shore areas, work sites and offshore installations from possible adverse effects
of maritime traffic.
2. Contracting Governments undertake to arrange for the establishment of VTS
where, in their opinion, the volume of traffic or the degree of risk justifies such
services.
3. Contracting Governments planning and implementing VTS shall, wherever
possible, follow the guidelines developed by the Organization. The use of VTS
may only be made mandatory in sea areas within the territorial seas of a coastal
State.
4. Contracting Governments shall endeavour to secure the participation in, and
compliance with, the provisions of vessel traffic services by ships entitled to fly
their flag.
5. Nothing in this regulation or the guidelines adopted by the Organization shall
prejudice the rights and duties of Governments under international law or the
legal regimes of straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea
lanes
Source: Lloyd’s Register 2005, p.469
Regulation 12, explains that, the overall purpose of VTS’s to protect human life,
enhance navigation, and protect the environment. It provides the requirement to
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establish and operate a VTS to the discretion of government and advises parties to
arrange to provide VTS service when the volume of vessel traffic as well as the risk in
navigation justifies such services. The regulation points contracting governments to the
Resolution A.857(20) “Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services” as a major guide to
establishment. Nonetheless, it categorically noted that both the requirements in SOLAS
and Resolution A.857(20) “shall prejudice the rights and duties of Governments under
international law or the legal regimes of straits used for international navigation and
archipelagic sea lanes” (Lloyd’s Register, 2005, p.462). This means that governments
should be mindful for example of the legal implications of accidents cause by VTS
instructions. Whilst the IMO publishes guidelines such as those given in Resolution
A.857 (20), it is this portion of the SOLAS convention that is the most important with
respect to VST (Huges, 2009).
3.5 Definitions and Clarifications of VTS Terms
There are quite a number of terminologies defined by the IMO in Resolution A.857 (20)
that are examined in this study. The terms most used and require definition in this study
include Vessel Traffic Service, Competent Authority, VTS authority, VTS area, VTS
centre, VTS operator, and VTS service. The definitions of these terminologies are
adopted from IMO, Resolution A.857 (20). The International Maritime Organization
(1997, p.3) defines the following;
Vessel traffic service (VTS): a service implemented by a Competent Authority,
designed to improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the
environment. The service should have the capability to interact with the traffic
and to respond to traffic situations developing in the VTS area”
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Competent authority: the authority made responsible, in whole or in part, by the
Government for safety, including environmental safety, and efficiency of vessel
traffic and the protection of the environment.
VTS authority: the authority with responsibility for the management, operation
and co-ordination of the VTS, interaction with participating vessels and the safe
and effective provision of the service.
VTS area: the delineated, formally declared service area of the VTS. A VTS
area may be subdivided in sub-areas or sectors.
VTS centre: the centre from which the VTS is operated. Each sub-area of the
VTS may have its own sub-centre.
VTS operator: an appropriately qualified person performing one or more tasks
contributing to the services of the VTS.
VTS services: VTS should comprise at least an information service and may
also include others, such as a navigational assistance service or a traffic
organization service, or both, defined as follows:
An information service is a service to ensure that essential information becomes
available in time for on-board navigational decision-making.
A navigational assistance service is a service to assist on-board navigational
decision-making and to monitor its effects.
A traffic organization service is a service to prevent the development of
dangerous maritime traffic situations and to provide for the safe and efficient
movement of vessel traffic within the VTS area.
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In many jurisdictions such as Ghana, a Competent authority also is the VTS authority.
Ghana Maritime Authority is the state agency regulating the maritime industry and
ensuring protection of maritime environment. In this study the two are used to refer to
the same authority. The VTS area, centre, and operators are discussed later under
Ghana’s VTS. A VTS can provide all the three services defined above or at least one.
Ghana’s system proves information service and navigational assistance service.
Another important aspect that needs clarification is the naming system used in regions
where VTSs are established. According to Ustaoglu and Furusho (2014) although VTS
is the only acronym that has been officially defined by the IMO, one can see various
acronyms such as Vessel Traffic Information Services/System (VTIS), Vessel Traffic
Management Services/System (VTMS), Vessel Traffic Management and Information
Services/System (VTMIS), Vessel Traffic Control (VTC), Marine Traffic Control
(MTC). To a large extent these difference are due to the political regime of the VTS
area, capability of VTS elements, objectives of the Competent Authority among others.
With these differences there is a high probability that there would be functional
differences. For this study, VTS and VTMIS acronyms will mostly be used through out.
A VTMIS is regarded as an extension of VTS. In a very simplistic description, it is an
information system that stores data generated from VTS for processing and sharing
among many departments.
A VTMIS provides greater level of situational awareness because it is an integrated
maritime surveillance system that has multiple sensors and communication services.
According to Bowditch (2002), VTS is only part of a larger and much more
comprehensive information exchange system called VTMIS. He also argues that, under
VTMIS “not only can vessel traffic be managed from the standpoint of navigation
safety and efficiency, but also tugs, pilots, line handlers, inter- modal shipping
operators, port authorities, customs and immigration, law enforcement, and disaster
response agencies and others can use vessel transit information to enhance the delivery
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of their services.” Shelter International (2015) added on this that VTMIS is an
integration of a VTS generated data to a Management Information System (MIS). Thus
the MIS part is the system that hold intelligent processing capabilities of information
passed on by the VTS or fed directly into a database. Ghana’s VTMIS system provides
both VTS services and MIS data for government agencies.
3.6 Essential Components of a VTS System
As mentioned in the previous sections, in the early days only VTS personnel and radars
formed the core of VTS’ but as time went on and new innovations and technologies
emerged, other information gathering and communication tools were added. According
to Kop (as cited in Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014) the components of a basic VTS system
can be categorized into four parts namely hardware, staff, training and procedures. In
the same report Ustaoglu and Furusho also cited Wiersma et. al., that another
categorization group the components into three; people, hardware and procedures. The
three-component-model of people, hardware, and procedures is adopted in this study
because training needs of staff can be discussed under personnel category.
According to the (International Association of Marine Aids, 2013), the people
component, include VTS operators, supervisors, and managers. Operators work in VTS
centres controlling traffic in the port or on approach whilst supervisors supervises and
ensure that operations within a VTS centre conform to standards set by the VTS
authority. VTS Managers manages and coordinates the activities of the VTS centre or
centres on behalf of the VTS Authority. Training of VTS personnel is based on the
recommended format of IALA. Training course 103 contains detail recommendations
on training of VTS personnel. According to IALA, VTS Operators are trained by the
model course V-103/1 whilst Supervisors must have V-103/2. Apart from these, IALA
maintains that, certificated VTS personnel should receive On-the-Job Training (V-103/3
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VTS). Personnel are expected to maintain certification by refresher training and
revalidation.

Sources: Created by the author, based on an integration of the VTS model proposed by
Wiersma et.al (as cited in Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014) and VTS components described
in IALA VTS manual 2012.
Figure 1: Three-component-model of VTS
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The second component of the three-component-model is procedures. International
Association of Marine Aids (2011) noted that procedures should form an integral part of
a verifiable safety management system for the VTS. IALA recommends VTS
authorities to develop operational procedures because collection and dissemination of
information involves internal and external communications. Procedures for running a
VTS centre include the operation of systems and sensors, interactions among staff and
the internal data processing in routine and emergency cases are seen as internal
procedures. However, procedures that govern the interaction with participating vessels
are considered as external procedures.
The third component of the three-component-model is hardware. VTS hardware all
started with a simple radar but professors (Siousiouras and Dalaklis, 2009, p2) stated
that “new technologies and especially the further exploitation of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as traffic management systems can provide
new and more comfortable services to passengers, increase safety and security and
reduce the associated with traffic environmental impacts.” VTS equipment today
comprises communication equipment, radar, AIS, CCTV, hydrological sensors, weather
sensors, and VTS data system. The uses of that are associated with a particular VTS
would determine what hardware is integrated. Perhaps in the case of modern VTS and
VTMIS, another important subcomponent under hardware is software. This is used to
manipulate and control the hardware give better meaning to the data received.
3.7 Vessel Traffic Management and Information Services/System (VTMIS)
A VTMIS extends beyond the components of a VTS with the addition of a MIS
element. VTMIS process data from VTS equipment and makes it available for decisionmaking. The model in Figure 2, illustrates components of a basic VTMIS. Data from
sensors such as radars and AIS are fed into the VTS centre and such information is
communicated in a form of VTS service to vessels for navigational safety. The VTMIS
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database centre also pulls information from the VTS centre and process it. Port
authorities, Navy, Coast Guard department, SAR units, Maritime authorities, Policy
makers, etc can be served with the information to aid them in planning. VTMIS also can
be connected to Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT) data centres for
collecting maritime security-related information (European Commission, 2006). This
system enables global identification and tracking of ships. LRIT communicates
information on the identity of the ship and its position and allow Flag States to track
ships under its flag everywhere in the world. The hardware component discussed under
VTS in VTMIS is integrated with software under VTMIS.

Source: Adopted from Shelter International, 2015
Figure 2: Components of a VTMIS
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3.8 Definition of Maritime Security
According to Bueger (2014), today countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), United
States of America (US), and organizations such as the European Union (EU), African
Union, (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the MSC of IMO, all
include maritime security in their list of task. However, there is no agreed definition of
maritime security in the literature. Often, discussions loosely define it as the absence of
threats such as maritime inter-state disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, arms
proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime accidents that prevail in
the maritime domain. This approach has not been satisfactory since it does neither
prioritize issues, nor provides clues of how these issues are interlinked, nor outlines
how these threats can be addressed, not to talk of the puzzles over which threats to add
to the list. The meanings attached to maritime security will always vary; to cope with
this multi vocabulary Bueger proposed three frameworks, by semiotics, securitization,
and security practice theory. Semiotics maps different meanings of maritime security by
exploring the relations between it and other concepts whist securitization framework
provides the means to understand how different threats are included in maritime
security. To Bueger, security practice theory takes a closer look at the actions that are
undertaken in the name of maritime security in trying to understand the concept.
This study adopts one of Bueger’s proposed frameworks “semiotics” to help define and
understand the nature of maritime security in the GoG area. According to Bueger (2014,
p.160) “in semiotic thinking the meaning of a term can be grasped by exploring the
relations of the term to others.” He further explained that in the case of maritime
security, at least four concepts require consideration: seapower, marine safety, blue
economy, and human resilience. A matrix of these four concepts and how they relate to
maritime security is shown on Figure 3.
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Source: Bueger, 2014, p.161
Figure 3: Maritime Security Matrix
Seapower include concepts such as a nation’s comprehensive power and maritime
strategy, advanced maritime technology, command of the sea, sea denial, and naval
power. It relates to maritime security in areas of national security in the maritime
domain and inter-state disputes. According to Bueger, firmly based in a traditionalist
understanding of national security as the protection of the survival of states, seapower
aims at laying out the role of state naval forces and at elaborating strategies for their use
in the maritime domain. Naval forces are one of the major actors in maritime security
and concerns have always been for state forces should act outside their territorial waters,
engage in other regions than their own and have a presence in international waters.
Fransas, Nieminen, Salokorpi, and Rytkonen (2012) defined maritime safety as “the
combination of preventive measures intended to protect the maritime domain against,
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and limit the effect of accidental or natural danger, harms, damage to environment, risk
or loss.” According to Bueger (2014), maritime safety “in the first place implies the
regulation of the construction of vessels and maritime installations, the regular control
of their safety procedures as well as the education of maritime professionals in
complying with regulations.” Efforts at ensuring safety of ships and maritime
installations are aimed towards protecting maritime professionals and the marine
environment. According to Bueger, maritime safety concerns are core to maritime
security given that it may involve environmental and cultural interests. This is also
because the maritime industry is potential target of pirates, terrorists, trafficking of
persons, illicit goods, and weapons.
Shipping, fishing, and offshore resources such as crude oil play significant roles in
many economies today; coastal tourism is also important. Bueger (2014, p.161) argues
that the commercial value of oceans “blue-economy” has been re-evaluated because of
these contributions. Blue economy has seen significant endorsement in the world and
efforts have been made at “linking and integrating the different dimensions of the
economic development of the oceans and constructing sustainable management
strategies for these.”
Burger also supports that human security is the fourth concept necessary for
understanding maritime security. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
first proposed human security as an alternative concept for understanding national
security. Burger noted that “core dimensions of human security concern food, shelter,
sustainable livelihoods and safe employment.” The sea is a major source of food,
livelihood, and employment to many in less developed countries. In effect Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major concern to human security. Issues
such as security of seafarers and vulnerability of coastal populations to maritime threats
are but few in this list. According to Bueger (2014, p.161), “notably the resilience of
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coastal populations has been identified as a key factor in the emergence of maritime
threats and is hence vital in their prevention.”
Having reviewed the relationship of these four concepts and maritime security, Bueger
(2014, p.161), concluded that “the semiotic perspective implies that for understanding
what meaning actors subscribe to maritime security we can study the relations they
suggest to those other concepts.” Projected graphically, Bueger built a Maritime
Security Matrix (MSM) (refer to Figure 3) that showed the relations between the
concepts in ideal typical terms. Maritime security takes central place in the matrix and
different issues of maritime security are plotted as they relate to seapower, maritime
safety, blue economy, and human resilience. One of the advantages of working with the
MSM is that it allows for the study of the types of relations established by different
actors between maritime security and other concepts. It also provides bases for
scrutinizing what actors include and exclude in their concept of maritime security.
However, a weakness is that interpretations of threats can differ remarkably.
According to Bueger (2014, p.161), the MSM is an:
“Ideal-typical version which reflects how the author would relate the concepts to
one another. It is important to note that drawing on the matrix does not imply
starting out from any idealized understanding and to argue that maritime
security should integrate all of the four other concepts. The matrix is an
analytical tool to grasp the differences and commonalities of understandings of
different actors.”
The choice of which of the four concepts of seapower, maritime safety, blue economy,
and human resilience in Bueger’s “Semiotics” concept in defining maritime security
varies. Bueger believes that this is because security actors significantly diverge over
how they draw these relations and position threats within them. He stated that whereas
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maritime security strategies of some international organizations and countries such as
the EU and the UK have strong relations to all four concepts and argue for a
comprehensive approach that emphasizes the connectivity of the issues, others such as
NATO and the African Union (AU) focuses on only some aspects of the MSM. He
states that, NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy “excludes the lower, left corner from its
understanding of maritime security in arguing that these are separate so called high end
tasks, and then primarily focuses on issues related to the blue economy and human
resilience” (Bueger, 2014, p.162).

By contrast Bueger noted that, the African

Integrated Maritime Strategy of the AU “centers on the blue economy and argues that
maritime security challenges are primarily relevant because they hamper economic
growth. Starting out from the upper right corner the AU quite surprisingly excludes
traditional considerations of interstate dispute or state rivalry from its strategy.”
In applying the MSM of Bueger, this study defined maritime security as it relates to
maritime safety, blue economy and human resilience. Since this study focuses on the
use of VTS in enhancing maritime security, the seapower aspect is deemed beyond the
scope of the study. Embracing a definition of maritime security based on seapower
would invariably include such agencies as the Navy, and other national agencies. This
would take the focus of the study out of context. Therefore the first concept in Bueger’s
proposal for understanding maritime security by semiotics is not covered in this study.
In effect maritime security is used in this study unless otherwise stated to refer to the
presence of issues such as maritime accidents, pollution, smuggling, piracy, robbery,
IUU fishing, and human trafficking, in the GoG. These maritime security threats are
also collectively called crime in this study. The focus is on the role VTMIS play in
fighting these and other maritime threats that relates to maritime safety, blue economy,
and human resilience.
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3.9 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)
The GoG area is located in West Africa stretching to the North-Western and SouthWestern parts of the African continent. The definition of the GoG region shall be
restricted to the area in 10° South to 30° North by 30° West to 15° East as adopted in
(Greidanus, Alvarez, Eriksen, & Barbas, 2013), see map in Figure 4. There are more
than 15 countries in this region by reference is made especially to the coastal countries
who directly deal with issues of maritime security in the GoG area.

Sources: Greidanus, Alvarez, Eriksen, & Barbas, 2013, p.10
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Sources: Anyiam, 2014, p2.
Figure 4: Maps of West Africa indicating the Gulf of Guinea area
Reviewing ship traffic distributions and statistics in the narrower GoG area by
Greidanus and others, shows a significant vessel density of 7,000 ships visible by AIS
in the area during 6 months. Their study found that “whereas density maps show that
cargo ships and oil tankers normally follow the major maritime traffic routes across the
Atlantic Ocean and along the coast of Africa, the position reports from the fishing fleet
shows high concentrations on the fishing grounds as well as how the fishing areas
change seasonally” (Greidanus, et. al, 2013, p.55). This density comes with significant
maritime security threats in the area. According to Schembri (2012), the lack of any
maritime security strategy amongst the 15-member Economic Community of West
Africa States (ECOWAS) is having a significant effect across the region where
maritime criminal activity is on the rise. The report noted that the GoG area is home to
maritime security threats such as transnational organised crime, including oil bunkering,
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robbery at sea, hostage taking, human and drug trafficking. According to professor
(Dalaklis, 2012, p.5) “the problem of piracy is by no means limited to the Gulf of Aden
and/or the Indian Ocean. Somali pirates have now expanded their operations up to the
west coast of India. Many analysts believe that the worrying rise in the number of
attacks off the coast of West Africa will result in the region becoming the next piracy
hotspot.” Schembri added that these maritime security threats are mounting concerns for
the safe passage of vessel, cargo and crew through this high-risk area.
In the literature, there is a consensus that the rate of unlawful acts (crime) against
vessels in the GoG area has been on the increase in recent years. According to Hart
(2014, p.3) maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea includes theft, robbery, and assault,
kidnap and hijack. Hart claimed that between 2008 and 2013, there was a 30% increase
in overall activity. There are two key trends in the Gulf of Guinea: kidnapping for
ransom and hijacking for cargo; 355% increase in maritime kidnapping for ransom; and
12.5% decline in hijacking for cargo incidents. Anyiam (2014) however stated that
information on the exact nature of such unlawful acts in the region is distorted and
unreliable with confusing statistics hampering efforts to suppress the menace. Anyiam
attributed this to confusing definition of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Critical
assessment of the IMO Regional Analysis of West Africa from 1995 to 2015 on Table
1, indicated that 80.4% of the reported incidents of unlawful acts against vessels in
West African (GoG) should be properly and legally classified as armed robbery. These
statistics seem to prove Anyiam’s claim.
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Table 1: Extract from regional analysis of reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery
in West Africa
NUMBER

LOCATION OF INCIDENT
In international waters

176

In territorial waters

312

In port area

412

NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK
1-4 persons

259

5-10 persons

234

More than 10 persons

87

Not stated

300

OTHER
Lives lost (unit: people)

48

Wounded crew (unit: people)

183

Missing crew (unit: people)

10

Crew hostage (unit: people)

614

Assaulted (unit: people)

216

Ransom

0

TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS REPORTED
Sources: International Maritime Organization (2015,
https://gisis.imo.org/Public/PAR/Reports.aspx?Name=RegionalAnalysis)
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900

It is important to note that Anyiam’s report did not set out to disprove the presence of
maritime security threats in the GoG. Indeed the report states “it is impossible to have
an effective solution to a problem without establishing the nature of the problem.”
Anyiam argue that “in formulating an effective strategy to repress the surge in unlawful
acts against the safety of maritime navigation in GoG it is vital that we first appreciate
the exact nature of the problem from a legal perspective.” For any security measure to
be fruitful in combating crimes against vessels in GoG it must be based on a sound legal
footing bearing in mind the rights and obligations of states within the various maritime
zones under UNCLOS with issues relating to sovereignty and jurisdiction, and also the
various maritime boundary disputes in the region due to the discovery of crude oil. In
view of this maritime security threats are viewed in this study in relation to Anyiam’s
concept. Acts of crime done in territorial waters are considered under the jurisdiction of
the said maritime state whereas those done in international waters are considered as
such. Piracy for example the IMOs’ definition recognizes a distinction between piracy
as only occurring in international waters and all other unlawful acts within internal and
territorial waters and port facilities as armed robbery (Anyiam, 2014).
3.10 VTMIS and Maritime Security
Both (Anyiam,) and (Schembri,) agree that threats of maritime security in the GoG are
rooted onshore. Issues such as poverty, unemployment, corruption and free access to
weapons are some of the causes of threats in the GoG. There are many suggestions for
combating the challenges in maritime security in the GoG area including gaining
consensus between affected nations and regional cooperation, tackling the root causes
ashore, enforcing legislation among many other factors. Arguable the use of VTMIS
will enhance efforts at bringing down the maritime security threats or crime in the GoG.
According to Anyiam (2014, p.12), “GoG States must invest in modern technology in
their efforts to combat maritime crime due to the large expanse of the area to be kept
under surveillance.” He argued that it is possible for states to have virtual control of
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their maritime domains by investing in various maritime surveillance technologies.
Anyiam list AIS, LRIT, vessel monitory system, vessel detection system, and VTS as
examples of available technology for maritime surveillance.
Apart from the core uses of VTS for Information Service, Traffic Organization Service,
and Navigational Service the upgrading of a VTS into a VTMIS help governments in
many ways. Many agencies such as fisheries, customs, immigrations service, port
authorities, national intelligence units, the Navy, coast guard, Search and Rescue units
would be able to utilize information stored and processed for planning, forecasting, as
well as detecting maritime related crime. There are many VTS equipment that feed
information into the VTMIS for analysis. Some of these equipment and how they can be
used in combating maritime crime are reviewed as follows.
A VTS Radar (see pictures in Figure 5) is a system for detecting the presence, direction,
distance, and speed of aircraft, ships, and other objects, by sending out pulses of radio
waves which are reflected off the object back to the source. According to (International
Association of Marine Aids, 2012) a VTS radars typically function like a ship’s radar.
However VTS radar are sometimes customized to operate simultaneously on short and
long-range identification.
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Source: (International Association of Marine Aids, 2012, p.81)
Figure 5: Radar (top Rotherdam-Netherlands, left side: Zandvliet-Belgium, right:
Genova-Italy)
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According to IALA, radar is required to be able to detect and track, for subsequent
display, all specified moving or stationary targets which satisfy the detection criteria
within the specified coverage areas and during all specified operating circumstances.
They help in developing vessel traffic images. Plotted radar images allows for presence,
direction, distance, and speed detection. In the absence of other sophisticated
equipment, radar offers a rudimentary technic for identifying suspicious targets at sea
and to take necessary action.
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is intended as a supporting tool to enhance
safety of life at sea, the safety and efficiency of navigation, and the protection of the
marine environment. European Commission (2008, p.7) noted that the AIS is a shipborne transponder system designed in the first instance for maritime safety and in
particular collision avoidance. They are built with a transponder unit including GPS,
VHF transmitter/ receiver and display / terminal. The vessel AIS broadcasts a message
at regular intervals containing its identification, position, speed, course plus a number of
detailed items about the ship and its cargo such as ship length, draft, cargo type, ports of
providence and destination. To make it very secured, the ship identification (MMSI
number) and some static data are hardwired into the device. Regulation 19 of Chapter V
of the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 as amended
requirement for vessels to have AIS. The benefits to AIS include the automatic identity
of a vessel’s MMSI or call sign, which helps to facilitate rapid radio communication
and ships data reception. They provide timely, relevant, and accurate information about
vessels within the area that might affect safety, security, or the decision-making of a
VTMIS. Although some information in the vessel’s AIS can be manipulated and the
AIS can be switched off, generally together with the radar it still aid in tracking and
apprehending vessels in time of maritime crime.
Another important part of a VTMIS is a Long Range Identification and Tracking
(LRIT) system. European Commission (2008) reports indicates that an LRIT is a
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messaging system for security and SAR purposes that is regulated by IMO through an
amendment of SOLAS Chapter V regulation 19. This is a mandatory tool for passenger
ships, cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and up on international voyages and mobile
offshore drilling units. Whereas the AIS device receives information as far as the line
of sight the LRIT is global through the use of satellite cans. Additionally, LRIT sends
data to specific recipients for confidential treatment unlike AIS which broadcasts.
Another handy component of a VTMIS is Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
(GMDSS). This system allows ships to alert authorities on shore as well as other ships
in case of an emergency. GMDSS equipment includes VHF and MF radio with Digital
Selective Calling (DSC) facility among others. These identification, tracking, and
alerting systems facilitate measures aimed at preventing maritime security and crime.
Some modern VTMIS also integrate satellite facilities to enhance coverage areas.
According to Professor Dalaklis, Siousiouras, and Nikitakos (2009), the VTMIS in
Greece elevates the role the country plays above the regional scale and contributes to
the effective protection of the Greek Seas, with change for policy-makers from
suppression to prevention. VTS around the world improves the safety and efficiency of
navigation, safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment and or the
adjacent shore area, worksites and offshore installations from maritime security threats
and adverse effects of maritime traffic. Ghana’s VTMIS would be investigated inline
with these equipment to understand the set-up, capabilities and effectiveness in
improving maritime safety and security.
3.11 The Nature of VTS/VTMIS in Ghana
According to reports published on the commissioning of the VTMIS project by GMA,
the VTMIS is an integrated system established to enhance continuous electronic
surveillance of the entire coast of Ghana. Ghana Maritime Authority (2014) reports
indicated that, under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport, it acquired land for
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construction of control centres and erection of eleven towers for the coastal and lake
sites; installed microwave/internet/WAN communication links; acquired frequencies for
microwave communications, installed hydrological buoys; among others to establish a
national VTMIS.
The VTMIS is made up of one national control centre and three area control centres.
These include National Control Centre (NCC), area West Control Centre (WCC), area
East Control Centre (ECC), and Navy Head quarters area Control Centre. GMA reports
noted that these four control centres are fed with data from twelve remote sites. Eight of
the twelve remote sites for coastal surveillance are called Remote Sensor Sites (RSS).
They are located across the coast area of Ghana from east to west at Keta (Woe), Big
Ada, Tema, Winneba, Cape Coast, Takoradi, Axim, and Epunsa (Half Assini). The
remaining three remote sites for automatic identification of vessels at Volta Lake are
called Remote Base Stations (RBS). They are located inland along the banks of the
Volta Lake at Yeji, Kete Krachi and Anum.
In all, ten monitoring stations are also fed with information from the four control
centres. These monitoring stations include National Security, Narcotics Control Board
(NACOB), Naval Command East, Naval Command West, Ghana Ports and Harbours
Authority (GPHA), Fisheries Department, Ghana Immigrations Service, Customs and
Preventive Service (CEPS), Volta Lake Transport Company, Regional Maritime
University. The physical and logical set-ups of the system are illustrated on Figure 6.
One of the respondents said, “data from the remote sensor sites in the area east and west
are fed into WCC and ECC respectively.” The diagram in Figure 6 (B) illustrated the
direction of flow of data among the RSS, RBS, and control centres in the system. The
WCC and ECC intend send the data to the NCC. Navy HQ area control centre gets it
feed from the NCC. However the three inland RBS feed data direct to the NCC.

43

GHANA'SVTMIS

4 CONTROL
CENTRES

8 Remote
Sensor Sites

3 Remote Base
Stations

10 Monitoring
Stations

A: Physical set-up

B: Logical set-up
Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2014, p.8
Figure 6: Overview of NCC and Area Control Centre of Ghana’s VTMIS
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A: National Control Centre at GMA HQ

45

B: VTMIS West Control Centre (WCC)

Source: GMA Dairies, 2014
Figure 7: Control Centres at A: Accra (GMA HQ) and B: Takoradi (WCC)
3.12 Hardware and Software Components
The hardware and software component of the VTMIS in Ghana is discussed under
Control centres, the monitoring station, and the remote sites. The control centres are all
equipped with data centres, two Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems
(GMDSS) VHF Digital Selective Calling (DSC) devices, Workstations and displays,
and IP-phones. Information received for the RSS and RBS is stored at the data centres
in databases. The data centres collate, stores, and process data from the RSS and RBS.
The workstations and display are used for visualizing, displaying and presenting the
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information to VTMIS operators (see picture at Figure 8). The operators keep watch on
24/7 bases on shifts in the control centres. The IP-phones are used for internal
communication between the control centres, the monitoring stations, and the RSS and
RBS. The IP-phone enables internal voice-over-IP communication between these sites.

Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014)
Figure 8: Workstations and Display unites at the control centres of the VTMIS in Ghana
Ghana’s VTMIS centres are equipped with GMDSS devices. According to Inmarsat
(2015), the IMO adopted GMDSS in 1988 with amendments to SOLAS Chapter IV.
GMDSS is an international system that uses terrestrial and satellite technology and
shipboard radio systems to send automated alerting to shore-based communication and
rescue authorities as well as ships in the immediate vicinity in the event of distress at
sea. A core component of the GMDSS is the VHF DSC device. DSC is a paging system
that uses data signals to automate the transmission and reception of calls on VHF
marine radio channel 70 (see picture at Figure 9).
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Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014)
Figure 9: GMDSS (VHF DSC) set at Ghana
For purposes of redundancy, 50 KVA generators, Uninterruptible Power Supplies
(UPS), and Automatic Voltage Regulators (AVR) have been installed at all the control
centres, monitoring stations, RSS and RBS. These centres and sites have been
networked with fiber optic WAN, Internet, and microwave networks. These ensure that,
the system runs without interruptions.
The monitoring stations are equipped with a set of workstation and an IP-phone. The
workstation receives data from the control centres. These departments put personnel in
charge to monitor activities depending on their special interests. Every monitoring
station perform similar operations as the control centres except that, the features and
functions are limited to the use of a monitoring station. They monitor vessel traffic and
can use IP-phones to communicate with control centres for detail information that may
not be available to them.

A picture of the equipment setup in one of the monitoring

stations is at Figure 10.
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Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014)
Figure 10: Equipment setup at Ghana’s VTMIS Monitoring Stations
The RSS and RBS are equipped with Radars scanners, CCTVs, weather sensors, VHS
and AIS antennas, and microwave communication disc. These equipments are mounted
on a 15 metres towers. A picture of one of the towers and equipment is at Figure 11.
The RSS and RBS also have communication devices that send the data from the above
devices to the data centres at control centres. The shelter that contains the
communication devices also have IP-phones in them to allow officers at the sites to
communicate with personnel at the control centres.
With regards to hardware component, the VTMIS in Ghana is impressive. It is yet to be
integrated with satellite technologies that can extend it and increase the coverage area.
however, with the right procedures and personnel, the system can be used to conduct
effective surveillance along the GoG area.
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Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2014, p.12
Figure 11: Equipment at the VTMIS RSS and RBS

50

3.13 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed related literature on use of VTS and VTMIS. It discussed the
history of VTS and evolution to VTMIS. IMO guidelines and legislation setting
requirements for establishing and operating VTS were also reviewed. The establishment
of coastal surveillance system emerged in the 1950s to aid navigation and enhance
safety at sea.

Eventually in 1985, IMO came out with resolution A.578(14) on

guidelines for vessel traffic service and revised it in 1997 as A.578(14) to further
strengthen measures aimed at improving safety and efficiency in movement of maritime
traffic. This resolution also contains the definitions of concepts and terms used in the
VTS domain. Regulation 12, chapter V of the SOLAS convention included
requirements for governments that established VTS.
Based on a model attributed to Wiersma et.al (as cited in Ustaoglu and Furusho, 2014),
VTS components are put under three main groups. These include people/personnel,
procedures, and hardware/software. A well-organized VTMIS system should have all
these components developed and functioning as required. In the discussion that follows
in chapter four, Ghana’s VTMIS would be evaluated in light of these components to test
its strengths in improving safety, security and protection of maritime environment.
Maritime security is a difficult term to define. As such the concept is seen as a
buzzword and attached to different meanings in the literature. A study of this nature
however needed a delimited meaning to what constitute maritime security or crime.
This will enable the study to easily identify unlawful acts or crimes in the GoG. The
study reviewed the work of (Bueger, 2014) on maritime security. Although Bueger
proposed three frameworks, by semiotics, securitization, and security practice theory, to
defining maritime security, the study adopted only the semiotic framework for defining
maritime security. This framework related maritime security to four concepts: seapower,
marine safety, blue economy, and human resilience. However, seapower was left out
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because its inclusion would take the study out of context. Applying the MSM of Bueger
maritime security is used in this study to refer to the presence of issues such as maritime
accidents, pollution, smuggling, piracy, robbery, IUU fishing, and human trafficking in
the maritime domain.
A review of IMO data and (Hurt, 2014) on piracy and armed robbery revealed reported
cases in the GoG area. According Professor (Dalaklis, 2012), many analysts believe that
the worrying rise in the number of attacks off the coast of West Africa will result in the
region becoming the next piracy hotspot. Hart (2014) stated that between 2008 and
2013, there was a 30% increase in overall activity. Anyiam agreed to the presence of
threats to maritime security in the GoG area but noted that the confusing definition of
piracy and armed robbery at sea for example is partly to blame for the alarming reports
of such cases in the GoG area. This study adopted Anyian’s concept of identifying
maritime security threats with regards to whether they are done within a jurisdiction of
high seas.
VTS/VTMIS have evolved to become very sophisticated today. VTMIS now include a
wide range of devices such as advanced Radars, AIS equipment, LRIT databases,
GMDSS systems and satellite integrations. These additions have further enhanced
VTS/VTMIS usage around the world to improve safety and efficiency of navigation,
safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment. Following in chapter
four, Ghana’s VTMIS is investigated inline with these new technology to understand its
capabilities and effectiveness in improving maritime safety and security especially in
the countries jurisdiction and in the GoG area at large.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSIONS ON THE ROLE OF VTMIS AND MARITIME SECURITY IN
GULF OF GUINEA AREA
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses results from primary qualitative data collected from interviews
conducted via Google Docs forms, emails, and phone calls of staff from the Ghana
Maritime Authority (GMA) and other state agencies that uses the VTMIS facility in
Ghana. The discussion also used secondary data from publication of the GMA on the
VTMIS project. In addition secondary data on regional piracy and armed robbery from
the IMO website and maritime crime data from (Hart, 2014) is included in the
discussion. The discussion is put under four themes namely, the set-up of Ghana’s
VTMIS; contributions of VTMIS to protecting offshore installations; usefulness of
VTMIS in combating crime in the GoG; and the shortfalls of Ghana’s VTMIS.
The first theme discusses the nature of the three VTS components of Ghana’s VTMIS.
It looks at the hardware and software equipment integrated, the coverage area; the
personnel operating the facility; and the procedures (guidelines and regulations)
governing the system. The second theme discusses the role Ghana’s VTMIS play in
securing offshore installations. This section looks at specific state or private facilities
and how they are being protected by the VTMIS system. The third theme, discusses the
role Ghana’s VTMIS play in fighting maritime crime. The section identifies particular
crimes or unlawful acts at sea according to Bueger semiotic framework and discusses a
technology in the VTMIS that can help combat the threat. The fourth theme discusses
the shortfalls of Ghana’s VTMIS. Based on the discussion preceding this section, an
evaluation of the countries VTMIS is possible in relation to current technology and
capabilities of VTMIS in the world.
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4.2 The Components of VTMIS in Ghana
To help understand further the composition of the components of the VTMIS in Ghana
and to add to what has already been discussed in the literature, questions on the
hardware and software components, the operational procedures, and training
requirements of VTMIS personnel were added to the interview guide. On personnel
development, the participants were asked the following questions: “what is your
background?” and “what are the training requirements for VTS staff?” All the
participants involved in the interviews from GMA were either Marine Radio Officers or
Merchant Captains. They had worked on vessels as radio officers or as masters for some
years. They all stated that IALA training and certification was required for VTMIS
operators. All participants had gone through training as VTS operators according to the
IALA VTS 103 modules.
The participants from other government agencies had past experiences in Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) and others were just new officers recruited and
trained purposely to work at the monitoring stations. Unlike the VTMIS personnel at
GMA, the personnel from other agencies did not have training on VTS operation as
required by IALA and IMO regulations. This is because they are only responsible for
manning monitoring stations, which are not operated like VTS centres but merely for
monitoring purposes. It is only in the three control centres, the NCC, WCC, and ECC
that VTS assistance is provided for. However, all the participants from GMA and the
other government agencies had been formally taken through the “JMAP” software used
for the monitoring of vessels.
When the participants were asked whether there are regulations which VTMIS
authorities are expected to comply? The responses revealed that the VTMIS is expected
to be regulated by requirements of the IMO, Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE), and International Telecommunication Union (ITU). IMO legislation
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such as in SOLAS Chapter V, regulation 12 and guidelines contained in the Resolution
A.857 (20). The IEEE define standards for communication data between electronic
devices and whilst the ITU is a special UN agency that standardizes ICT technology
such as wireless technologies, aeronautical and maritime navigation, radio astronomy,
satellite-based meteorology, convergence in fixed-mobile phone, Internet access, among
many others.
The percipients from GMA were all able to give a general structure of the nature of
VTMIS in Ghana. One interviewer said “there are four control centres namely, Area
West, Area East, Central, and the Navy. Area West and Area East feed data into the
national HQ at central control centre. The VTMIS covers the entire coast of Ghana and
the inland Volta lake.” Another participant from GMA said the VTMIS is made up of
“4 control centers, 8 remote sites, 3 AIS bases, and 10 monitoring centers. The data
centres at the control centers stores information received for the RSS and RBS. The
database software backup and process the information for consumption. The operators
monitor and keep watch on Ghana’s maritime domain using the workstations and
displays in the control centres.
However, when participants were asked to list government agencies that benefited from
the VTMIS and the nature of information they received from the system, the story was
different. All respondents listed some other agencies apart from their own that are
linked up to the system. Apparently, GMA had organized training sessions on the use of
the software and other operational regulations for the operators of the monitoring
station.
All the participants from GMA again were well vested in knowledge about the
hardware components of VTMIS. Participants were asked two major questions on
hardware components during the interviews. These include “What are the
communication mediums used in the VTMIS to contact and communicate with vessels
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and between VTS centres? Also list the various sensor devise integrated” and “How far
in terms of nautical miles is the coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS?”

The

communication devices listed included AIS, VHF/DSC, and IP-phone. AIS texting and
VHF/DSC are used for communicating with vessels whereas IP-phone are used for
internal communication.
The sensors listed include AIS antennas, CCTV, Radar, Hydrological sensors, and
weather sensors. The participants said that the eight RSS and three RBS are each
equipped with Radar scanner, VHF antenna, AIS antenna, weather sensors,
Hydrological sensors, and CCTV cameras. These devices are mounted on 55 metres
steel towers. The Radar is used for scanning vessels. Particularly the radars aid in
identifying vessel which have their AIS switched off or do not have them fitted at all.
The coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS Radars is 50 nautical miles offshore. The
advantage of the radar also includes its ability to determine course (direction) and
speed. GMA participants also said the CCTV capture and feed close proximity videos to
the system for monitoring areas around the ports. With the CCTV the system is able to
view areas closed to the sensor sites for up to 15 nautical miles. The AIS devices pick
signals from vessels fitted with AIS transponders and LRIT is able to track vessels in
many parts of the world. A participant summed up the coverage areas by these devices
as follows “LRIT - 1000 nm, AIS - 300 nm, Radar - 90 nm, and CCTV - 14 nm.” As
discussed in the literature, Ghana’s VTMIS also included a GMDSS set. The GMDSS
(VHF DSC) set are for communicating with vessels via broadcast and on designated
channels. The GMDSS is used to receive alerts from vessels in distress so that the
appropriate action can be taken.
With all these communication devices and data sensors Ghana’s system has the required
technology and expertise to run a well functioning VTMIS. The interviews revealed that
the VTMIS operators from GMA are trained according to IALA recommended course
VTS 103. It also revealed that the VTMIS authorities are aware and operate the system
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in Ghana in accordance with procedures, legislation, guidance and standardization from
international organizations such as the IMO and IALA, ITU, and IEEE. On hardware,
the interviews revealed that the VTMIS in Ghana has the basic infrastructure necessary
for conducting descent surveillance on safety and maritime security in the GoG area.
4.3 VTMIS contribution to Security of Offshore installations in Ghana
The first sub-objective of the study was to investigate how VTS can contribute to the
increase security level of offshore installations. Some of the interview questions were
therefore designed to aid the study investigated and the role VTMIS play in protecting
offshore installations such as cables, oilrigs, and pipelines in Ghana. Reviewing the
development of VTS, it was indicated that, the primary reason for its development was
to ensure navigational safety. However, maritime safety is far broader than just
navigational safety. According to IALA VTS Manual, traffic surveillance systems were
simply made of shore-based radar combined with VHF radio to enhance real-time
information exchange between the shore and ships for navigational purposes. According
to (Bueger, 2014) maritime safety includes the regulation of the construction of vessels
and maritime installations, the regular control of their safety procedures as well as the
education of maritime professionals in complying with regulations.
With developments in technology that allows for resources in remote areas in the sea to
be explored, there has been the need for many installations in the maritime industry. In
Ghana, there are installations at the Salt-pound and Jubilee oil fields for exploration and
drilling of crude oil. In addition to resources explorations, many countries have installed
pipelines to transport water, gas, or crude oil to processing units shore based. The West
Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) and the gas pipeline linking FPSO Kwame Nkrumah to
the processing units at Takoradi are examples of pipeline maritime installations in the
coastal waters of Ghana. Internet revolutions have also led to many telecommunication
companies running their communication cables through the sea. Main One, MTN, and
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Glo all have communication cables running across the GoG linking countries of West
Africa to the rest of the World.
In connection with this sub objective to investigate how the VTMIS in Ghana
contributes to increase security level of offshore installations such as cables, pipe lines,
and oil rigs, the participants were first asked to state the usefulness of the VTMIS to
Ghana and the West African sub-region. This was meant to test general theoretical
knowledge of the possible uses of VTMIS in Ghana and West African region. One of
the participants called said the VTMIS could be used for:
“Safety of navigation, prevention of vessels from entering restricted areas, control
of vessels around subsea structures, anti piracy controls, anti pollution controls,
vessel reporting system controls, narcotics control, aid to search and rescue, and
inland water safety at the Volta lake.“
Another participant said the system is used for:
“For ensuring security at national protected areas like the oil fields, protecting
private communication cables installed in through the sea, protecting the West
African Gas Pipeline, and giving information to vessels along the coast of Ghana.
There is also collaboration with the navy in identifying vessels patrolling in
unfitting zones and vessels that may be suspected to be violating any maritime
regulation. Basically, the VTMIS offices keep watch across the maritime area of
Ghana to ensure safety and security.”
Based on the responses, it can be said that generally the awareness of the uses of the
VTMIS is high. Although the first respondent quoted above was more general,
evidently the statements of the second respondent indicated that the participants were
mostly listing what the system was being used for. The participant use of statements
such as “we also collaborate with the navy in identifying vessels patrolling in unfitting
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zones and vessels that may be suspected to be violating any maritime regulation” and
“we basically keep watch across the maritime area of Ghana to ensure safety and
security” both reflect involvement. This shows a state of involvement and what is being
done rather than mere listing of what could be done.
The investigation further asked participants to state the targeted areas during VTMIS
operations? If indeed the VTMIS was being used for protecting offshore installations
then, those areas would be given a certain level of protection and identified for example
as restricted zones, no anchorage zone, or no fishing zones. The responses revealed that
the West African Gas Pipeline, Main One Sub Sea communication cables, Atuabo gas
pipeline, Area-To-Be-Avoided near the FPSO, western oil fields, and areas around the
national oil fields, are all targeted areas during operations.
The interviewees were also asked to explain how VTS could be used to provide security
monitoring of offshore installations. In the words of one participant, they do so by:
“Keeping watch 24-7 on Areas-To-Be-Avoided, and demarcated no anchorage
zones. Operators’ advice vessels to keep off protected areas and offshore
installations. Vessels are also advised not to anchor closed to pipelines and
communication cables. In addition, port authorities watch and advice vessels
appropriately.”
The display show tracks of vessels by radar and AIS and operators are able to see and
advice vessels to keep off such areas. Broadcast messages as well as AIS messages
enable VTMIS centres to communicate with vessels to ensure such areas are protected.
Fishing activities in exclusive zones such as the Jubilee oil fields are also monitored and
vessel in such areas are adviced to keep off.
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4.4 Protection of the West African Gas Pipeline
The interviews revealed that West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) is one of the targeted
offshore installation that the VTMIS is used to protect. A protection area is created
along the portion of the pipeline that runs on Ghanaian waters. The WAGP is a 678 km
gas pipeline that runs across coastal countries in the GoG. The pipeline delivers purified
natural gas for fuel for power plants and industrial applications. WAPCO (2015) report
stated that, WAGP links into the Escravos-Lagos pipeline at the Itoki Natural Gas
Export Terminal in Nigeria. The pipeline then runs offshore from Lagos Nigeria to
Takoradi in Ghana. The West Africa Gas Pipeline Company Limited (WAPCO) owns
and operates the WAGP.
Between Lagos and Takoradi, there are three laterals extending from the WAGP to
Cotonou in Benin, Lome in Togo, and Tema in Ghana. The lengths of the laterals are as
follows: Cotonou 7 nautical miles (13 Km), Lome 10.3 nautical miles (19 Km),
Tema 7.8 nautical miles (14 Km) (WAPCO, 2015). According to WAPCO, the average
water depth of the pipeline is varied. The average depth at sections offshore Ghana is 35
metres. Along the Ghana coast, the closest range is 3.5 nautical miles (6.5 kilometers)
south of Cape St. Paul. The widest range is south of Winneba at 17.5 nautical miles
(32.5 kilometers). The dimensions of the WAGP are as follows: the main pipeline is 20
inches in diameter; Cotonou lateral is 8 inches, Lome lateral is 8 inches; while the Tema
lateral is 18 inches. The termination point at Takoradi (Aboadzi) forms part of the main
pipeline (see picture at Figure 12).
WAPCO (2015) report indicated that, activities which constitute potential risk to
offshore WAGP damage include but not limited to: anchoring; ship Anchor Drag and
trawl board impact; bottom trawling; and Illegal Fishing methods such as use of
dynamite. Others include; mining including sand winning; construction; and any
activity that risk the chance of making physical contact with the sea bed within the zone
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and involves a risk of damaging the pipeline. The WAGP is very important to Ghana’s
economy and national security because it supplies fuel to the Thermal Power Plant at
Takoradi (Aboadzi) and Sunon Asogli in Tema. Any damage to the pipeline has the
ability to affect gas supply and power supply to Ghanaians.

Source: Ghana Oil Watch, 2013 (http://ghanaoilwatch.org/index.php/ghana-oil-and-gasnews/3225-gas-pipeline-95-complete-nigeria-to-resume-supply-in-days-energyminister)
Figure 12: The West Africa Gas Pipeline
According to (WAPCO, 2015) the West African Gas Pipeline suffered a catastrophic
loss of containment in early 2007 due, apparently, to damage by a ship's anchor.
Similarly, the Ghanaian Chronicle, a prominent newspaper in Ghana reported that in
August 2012, the WAGP was damaged by the anchor of a ship that was trying to avoid
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a pirate attack. Ghanaian Chronicles (2015) stated that, Aboadzi and Sunon Asogli
thermal power plants supply 580 megawatts about 32.5 per cent of electricity to Ghana.
The VTMIS monitoring of the WAGP is therefore significant contribution to national
security.

4.5 Protection of the Oil Fields and Private cables
Apart from the WAGP the interviews also noted the Atuabo gas pipeline, Area-To-BeAvoided near the FPSO, western Jubilee oil fields and salt-pound oil fields are all
targeted areas during operations. Just like the WAGP, these areas are monitored 24/7 at
the VTMIS control centres to ensure vessels navigate safely without destroying the
exclusive zones. There is an Area-To-Be-Avoided along the FPSO Kwame Nkrumah
(picture in Figure 13). The Oil fields are national assets and vessels seen loitering
around any filed without permit can be apprehended and questioned. Fishing vessels are
also adviced to keep off exclusive zones. Last but not the least, the responses indicated
that Main One Sub Sea communication cables are also being monitored. Main One is
one of the first private companies in Ghana to have their cables charted and monitored
by the VTMIS project. How the system could further be developed to increase it usage
is discussed under shortfalls in proceeding section.

62

Source: Ghana Maritime Authority (2014, 16)
Figure 13: Screen shots of the Jubilee field coverage showing the FPSO and other
Vessels

4.6 Fighting Maritime Crime in the GoG with VTMIS
The second specific objective is to access how VTMIS capabilities are integrated in the
effort to fight against crime in the GoG. There was the need to define the parameters of
maritime security and therefore maritime crime. According to (Bueger, 2014), maritime
security is a major threat to international shipping in the world today. Therefore
international organizations such as NATO, the AU, and the EU among others have
integrated maritime security strategies aimed at combating threats in the sea. However,
because security actors significantly diverge over how they draw relationships and
position threats within them, there are varied definitions of maritime security. Bueger’s
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MSM is applied in defining maritime security as it relates to maritime safety, blue
economy and human resilience. In this study it refers to the presence of issues such as
maritime accidents, pollution, smuggling, piracy, robbery, IUU fishing, and human
trafficking, in the GoG. These maritime security threats are also collectively called
crime in this study. The focus is on the role VTMIS play in fighting these and other
maritime threats that relates to maritime safety, blue economy, and human resilience.
4.7 Data on Maritime Crime
In Africa, the problem of piracy is not limited to the Gulf of Aden. Indeed, according to
Professor Dalaklis, many analysts believe that the worrying rise in the number of
attacks off the coast of West Africa will result in the region becoming the next piracy
hotspot (Professor Dalaklis, 2012). According to Allianz Global Corporate and
Specialty (2015) there were 59 total losses between 2005 and 2015 that occurred at the
GoG. Their report defined total losses as actual total losses or constructive total losses
recorded for vessels of 100 gross tons or over (excluding for example pleasure craft and
smaller vessels) as at the time of the analysis.
Data gathered from the Ghana Maritime Authority during the interviews revealed that
with regards to piracy and armed robbery, a total of 33 incidents occurred in 2014 as
compared to 20 incidents in 2015. All the incidents in 2014 happened between January
and August, between the same periods in 2015, the total number of incidents dropped to
20 representing 39.4 per cent decrement.
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Table 2: Incidents of Piracy in 2014 and 2015 in the GoG
2014
INCIDENT

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

TOTAL

Hijacked

1

0

1

0

0

2

1

0

5

Boarded

2

3

1

1

2

1

0

5

15

Attempt

0

2

2

1

1

1

0

3

10

Suspicious

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

3

Total

3

5

4

3

3

5

2

8

33

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

TOTAL

2015
INCIDENT

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

Hijacked

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

Boarded

1

0

6

1

3

1

0

0

12

Attempt

0

2

0

2

1

0

0

0

5

Suspicious

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Total

4

2

6

3

4

1

0

0

20

Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2015
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Table 3: Piracy in the GoG by country in 2014 and 2015
2014
COUNTRY JA
N

FE
B

MA
R

APR

MA
Y

JU
NE

JUL

AUG

TOTA
L

Angola

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Congo

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

3

6

Gabon

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Liberia

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Nigeria

0

3

3

3

1

1

0

3

14

Ghana

0

0

0

0

0

2

1

1

4

I.Coast

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

3

S. Leone

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Togo

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

2

Total

3

5

4

3

3

5

2

8

33

JU
N

JUL
Y

AUG

TOTA
L

2015
COUNTRY JA
N

FE
B

MA
R

APR

MA
Y

Nigeria

1

2

4

1

2

0

0

0

10

Ghana

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

I.Coast

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

2

Guinea

0

0

0

2

1

0

0

0

3

Congo

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

3

Total

4

2

6

3

4

1

0

0

20

Source: Ghana Maritime Authority, 2015.
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According to the European Union (2015) the International Maritime Bureau figures of
the GoG accounted for 18 per cent in 2013 and 16 per cent in 2014, of attacks
worldwide. Although about 80 per cent of these crimes against ships have taken place in
territorial waters, trends over the last couple of years shows a shift towards such
incidents occurring on the high seas and with a wider geographical spread further West
and South. Information on the incidents reported is varied. This is often attributed to
underreporting. Nonetheless, there is justifiable evidence that piracy and armed robbery
are on the increase in the GoG area.
According to the EJF (2012, p.4), “West African waters are estimated to have the
highest levels of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in the world.” The
EU report noted that IUU represents up to 37 per cent of the region's catch costing
coastal states around $1.3 billion per year. According to (European Commission, 2015,
p.8) trafficking and smuggling drugs, humans, and arms with related money-laundering,
also continues to grow across porous land and sea borders in West Africa, taking
advantage of continuing insecurity notably in the Sahel, and in other countries.
Evidently, maritime crime is on the increase in the GoG area.
Piracy anti pollution control, and narcotic control were among many factors the
participants listed under the usefulness of the VTMIS to Ghana and the West African
sub-region. As already discussed in previous section a participant said that VTMIS is
useful for “safety of navigation, prevention of vessels from entering restricted areas,
control of vessels around subsea structures, anti piracy controls, anti pollution controls,
vessel reporting system controls, narcotics control, aid to search and rescue, and inland
water safety at the Volta lake.” Asked specifically to state the role of VTMIS in
ensuring maritime security in Ghana, a participant said:
“VTMIS is a surveillance system that informs the appropriate authorities what to
do. GMA collaborate with Ghana navy to check on vessels that are suspected to
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be undertaking activities that causes threats to Ghana's maritime security. With
the VHF, vessels can report to the VTMIS when they are attacked by pirates.”
Some participant also said that the GMDSS set provide vessels the ability to notify
control centres and the Navy anytime they are in distress situation including attacks by
pirates and armed robbers at sea.
Participants were further asked specifically, how VTMIS could be integrated in the
fight against crime in the GoG. It was revealed that, the system allows “sharing of data
between relevant GoG agencies” and “effective exchange of information being the
VTMIS and enforcement units.” A participant noted in the Google Docs form that:
“Vessels that disable their AIS but are identified by the radar are checked; vessels
that stay in closed location for many hours are also checked; and vessels reported
to have been involved in crime in neighboring countries are monitored and
reported to the Ghana Navy when they appear within her jurisdiction. Other
maritime administrations are informed of vessels that violate maritime regulations
and leave Ghana's maritime domain for interdiction in other countries. In addition,
government security agencies can plan based on the vessel traffic data over the
months that VTMIS offer for necessary actions to improve security. CCTV
cameras locate vessels in close proximity and some details are identified.
Smuggling and offloading illegal substances into smaller boats can be seen
therefor the necessary actions taken; and vessels fishing in restricted areas
identified and advised or apprehended.”
The responses therefore revealed that, Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in
monitoring and reporting issues under maritime crime in the GoG area. This finding
confirms what the EU recommended for action in the “EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan
2015-2020.” According to the EU, the VTMIS in Ghana is one of the good national
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level examples already existing which enables access to information on cargo, namely
dangerous or polluting ones, transiting or calling at ports (European Union, 2015).
4.8 Shortfalls of the VTMIS in Ghana
The advantages and contributions of the VTMIS in Ghana are many; however the
system could be upgraded further to increase its usability. Participants were asked to list
the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool. They were also to explain how such
shortfalls could be removed from the system. Participants noted that, the VTMIS system
basically monitor and report and that it lacks the power to enforce regulations. Most of
the information communicated to vessels is given with soft message markers such as
“advice” or “information.” Ghana has no Coast Guard Centre so only the Navy and
Search and Rescue units are informed when vessel is suspected to be violating national
or international regulations. The VTMIS in Ghana therefor lacks the power to enforce.
According to one participant,
“When vessels do not comply with regulations; when AIS is switched off; when
LRIT data is absent; and when calls to vessels are not replied, VTMIS must be
empowered to sanction offenders.”
A follow up questions on the limitations in the use of VTS as a monitoring tool revealed
that separation of enforcement unit from monitoring system also prolongs responses to
incidents.
Another shortfall is the coverage ranges of the sensor equipment. The coverage areas of
equipment such as the CCTV, Radars, and AIS are currently 14Nm, 90NM, and 300NM
respectively. These could be extended by mounting and integrating equipment on patrol
boats.
One participant stated that:
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“If the CCTV could be extended to cover long Nautical miles, it would be very
useful. Some countries have added satellite communications to their VTMIS, if
our system was also integrated to a satellite, we would have better and wider
coverage than we have now. Ghana also needs a Coast Guard unit to work
together with the VTMIS to patrol out maritime waters. Coast guard would
release the navy to play their duty as a national naval force. Patrol boats would
also allow the SAR centre to contact vessels as soon as identified to be in
distress.”
Finally, it was also revealed, that closer collaboration among maritime administrations
along the GoG would enhance effective monitoring and reporting. The VTMIS in
Ghana has the ability to extend monitoring of the WAGP beyond Ghana. If there were
collaboration among West African countries, the usefulness of the system would
improve.
4.9 Conclusion
The great majority of participants stated that IALA training and certification was
required for VTMIS operators. All VTMIS operators had been trained as VTS operators
according to the IALA VTS 103 modules. The coverage area of Ghana’s VTMIS is as
follows; LRIT - 1000 nm, AIS - 300 nm, Radar - 90 nm, and CCTV - 14 nm.

Participants said the targeted areas during operation include: West African Gas Pipeline,
Main One Sub Sea communication cables, Atuabo gas pipeline, Area-To-Be-Avoided
near the FPSO, western oil fields, and areas around the national oil fields.
There is justifiable evidence that piracy and armed robbery are on the increase in
the GoG area. The interviews revealed Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in
monitoring and reporting issues under maritime crime in the GoG area. GMA
collaborate with Ghana navy to check on vessels that are suspected to be undertaking
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activities that are threats to Ghana's maritime security. The system also allows sharing
of data between relevant GoG agencies and effective exchange of information among
the VTMIS and enforcement units. Additionally, government security agencies can plan
based on the vessel traffic data from the VTMIS.
A major shortfall in Ghana’s VTMIS is lack of power to enforce regulation. As such,
information is communicated to the Navy and Search and Rescue units for appropriate
action. Another shortfall is the coverage range of the sensor equipment. The coverage
areas could be extended by mounting and integrating equipment on patrol boats.
Finally, it was also revealed that, collaboration among maritime administrations along
the GoG would enhance effective monitoring and reporting.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section summarizes all the important findings, conclusions and recommendations
of the study. The research was set out to assess the role of VTMIS in enhancing
maritime security in the GoG area and specifically to: investigate how it contributes to
the increase security level of offshore installations; access how its capabilities are
integrated in the effort to fight against crime in the GoG; and finally to identify short
falls in its use.

Participants were drawn from the VTMIS unit of the GMA and

government departments where monitoring stations are installed for interviews. The
discussion in the previous chapter was done based on the responses of the participants
to the interview questions. The data was discussed in line with the sub objectives of the
study. The rest of the chapter presents the findings and make recommendations for
policy makers and other researchers.
5.1 Findings
From the discussion of the qualitative data collected and reviews of secondary data
from the GMA and IMO on maritime incidents in the GoG, the following findings were
revealed:
1. The study revealed that VTMIS personnel of Ghana were trained according to
IALA VTS 103 modules and the system is being operated as required by IMO
and IALA guidelines for VTS.
2. The VTMIS in Ghana contributes to the increase security level of the West
African Gas Pipeline, Main One Sub Sea communication cables, Atuabo gas
pipeline, Area-To-Be-Avoided near the FPSO, Salt pound oil fields.
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3. Maritime crime such as piracy, armed robbery, and smuggling are on the
increase in the GoG region and the same post threats to vessels and seafarers.
According to (European Commission, 2015)
4. Ghana’s VTMIS contributes significantly in monitoring and reporting maritime
security issues in the GoG area..
5. It was revealed that a major shortfall in Ghana’s VTMIS is the lack of power to
enforce regulation effectively.
6. The study also concluded that future expansion in the range and coverage area
of the equipment is necessary for better and wider monitory and reporting.
7. Finally, it was revealed that lack of collaboration among maritime
administrations in West Africa limits the VTMIS usability in enhancing
effective monitoring and reporting beyond Ghana’s maritime jurisdiction.

5.2 Recommendations
The following recommendations are made based on the findings and conclusions of the
study:
1. The responses indicated that, apart from VTMIS operators from the GMA, staff
of the monitoring stations were only taken through JMAP software. The study
recommends that such staff should also be trained with IALA VTS 103 course
so they can fully appreciate and understand the procedures and data received.
2. The responses revealed that, Main One was the only privately owned company
to have their Sub Sea communication cables monitored by the VTMIS in Ghana.
The study recommends for other private sector companies to utilize the system
to ensure their offshore infrastructure is protected.
3. Although the VTMIS is used to monitor and report on suspected maritime
security threats issues, it is recommended for crew on board vessels to
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communicate sufficient information to the control centres in times of distress to
enable prompt assistance to be provided.
4. The study proposed for the VTMIS to be used by port authorities to organize
traffic at the two major ports in Ghana (Tema and Takoradi).
5. The study put forward the idea that, GMA should seek collaboration from
external funding organizations such as the EU who have interest in curtailing the
increasing piracy and other maritime security threats in the GoG. This will
enable the Authority to extend the range and coverage area of the system for
better monitoring.
6. IMO regulations mandate vessels to comply with regulations of VTS areas that
are recognized by IMO. Therefore GMA must strictly enforce navigational
regulations in its VTMIS areas.
7.

Collaboration among maritime countries in the GoG region is necessary to
combat the ever-increasing maritime security threats in the GoG. The study
recommends maritime Security Council of West African nations to act swiftly to
increase cooperation.

8. Other West African maritime nations are recommended to install and operate
VTMIS units to ensure the entire GoG region is covered. This would
significantly increase monitoring and reporting across the region.
9. The study recommends for future researchers to dig more into benefits of the
VTMIS data to monitoring stations.
10. Further research by the GMA is also needed in the area of operations to
understand how successful the VTMIS project has been since its inauguration.
The research and development should form an integral part of the project.
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APPENDIX

VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE AS A MARITIME SECURITY TOOL: VESSEL
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS (VTMIS) IN GHANA
Participants Consent Form
The role of the participant
This dissertation is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree
of Master of Science (MSc) degree at the World Maritime University. The study
intends to investigate the role of VTMIS in Ghana as a security tool that can effectively
assist in the fight against crime in the Gulf of Guinea region. Participants will be
engaged in 30-minute interviews about the operations and usefulness of the VST to help
me collect data for my investigation.
Participation and Confidentiality of data
Should you agree to participate, be informed that participation is not obligatory and you
are free to withdraw from the study at any point you may wish to do so. The data gather
for the investigation will be treated as confidential. In addition, anonymity of all
respondents will be preserved. The interviews will be tap-recorded. I Joseph Akwasi
Kuma or the World Maritime University (WMU) may retain the data gather in the
interviews for up to five years after the completion of the study.
Participants will not be paid for participating in these interviews. There is no anticipated
risk of physical or emotional injury.
Consent Statement
I have read and understood the information and I agree to take part in the study. By this
agreement, I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information
sheet, being used for this study and other research. I understand that all personal data
relating to volunteers is held and processed in the strictest confidence.
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Participant’s Name

Signature

…………………………………

……………………

Date:………………………….

VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE AS A MARITIME SECURITY TOOL:
VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
(VTMIS) IN GHANA
RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR GHANA MARITIME AUTHORITY VTMIS STAFF

1. What is your background?
2. Could you take me through the general set-up of the VTS system in
Ghana? (In terms of infrastructure).
3. What are the usefulness of the VTMIS to Ghana and the West African subregion?
4. Are there other government agencies that benefit from the VTMIS? (if so
list them and the nature of information they receive from VTMIS)
5. Are there targeted areas during VTMIS operations?
6. What are the communication mediums used in the VTMIS to contact and
communicate with vessels?
7. How far in terms of nautical miles is the coverage area of Ghana’s
VTMIS?
8. How can VTS be used to provide security monitoring of offshore
installations?
9. What is the role of VTMIS in maritime security?
10. How can VTS be integrated in the fight against crime in the GoG?
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11. What are the short falls in the use of VTS as a security tool and how can
they be removed?
12. What are the limitations in the use of VTS as a monitoring tool?
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